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 Time for a Change: On the Patterns of
 Diffusion of Innovation
 A MEDIEVAL PRELUDE
 The subject of this essay is the temporal patterns of the
 diffusion of technological innovations and what these pat
 terns may imply for the future of the human environ
 ment.1 But first let us set the clock back nearly one thousand years:
 return for a moment to monastic life in eleventh-century Bur
 gundy.
 Movement for the reform of the Benedictine rule led St. Robert
 to found the abbey of C?teaux (Cistercium) in 1098. C?teaux
 would become the mother house of some 740 Cistercian monas
 teries. About 80 percent of these were founded in the first one
 hundred years of the Cistercian movement; nearly half of the
 foundings occurred in the years between 1125 and 1155 (see Fig
 ure 1 ). Many traced their roots to the Clairvaux abbey founded as
 an offshoot of C?teaux in 1115 by the tireless St. Bernard, known
 as the Mellifluous Doctor. The nonlinear, S-shaped time path of
 the initial spread of Cistercian rule resembles the diffusion pat
 terns we will observe for technologies. The patterns of temporal
 diffusion do not vary across centuries, cultures, and artifacts: slow
 growth at the beginning, followed by accelerating and then decel
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 Figure 1. The Initial Diffusion of Cistercian Monasteries in Europe.
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 1877).
 erating growth, culminating in saturation or a full niche. Some
 times a symmetrical decline follows or a new growth pulse.
 Over time the Cistercians also diffused in space. Their pattern of
 settlements shows significant differences in spatial density. The
 innovation origin, Burgundy, was home to the four major mother
 houses and hosted the highest spatial concentration of settlements.
 From there, daughter houses were founded ("regional subinnovation
 centers," in the terminology of spatial diffusion), from which
 Cistercians spread further into their respective hinterlands ("the
 neighborhood effect") and to other subregional centers, originat
 ing yet further settlements. The density of settlements decreased at
 the periphery, away from innovation centers, implying persistent
 regional diversity and disparities. The Cistercians also differenti
 ated into "subfamilies," named after their respective parental houses.
 In fact, each subfamily followed its own pattern of settlements,
 regional specialization, and implementation of the Cistercian rule.
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 Some of the additions to the Cistercian rule were not genuine
 new settlements but "takeovers." For example, the existing
 Benedictine monastery of Savigny, with all its daughter houses,
 submitted to the rule of the Clairvaux Cistercians in 1147 and in
 turn became the mother house of all Cistercian settlements in the
 British Isles.
 Despite distance and differentiation, all the monasteries com
 municated closely. The industrious Cistercians thus introduced
 and channeled influential innovations, including new agricultural
 practices and the water mill, throughout Europe in the thirteenth
 and fourteenth centuries. The British monks excelled in wool
 production. In fact, according to the Cistercian rule, settlements
 were to be located in remote, undeveloped areas. Thus, Cistercian
 monasteries became important local nodes for the colonization of
 land within Europe and, hence, for deforestation.
 The Cistercian topology reveals a hierarchy of centers of cre
 ation and structured lines of spread. The patterns bear witness to
 the existence of networks. As we shall see, social and spatial
 networks, and their interactions, support and shape the diffusion
 process.2
 INVENTION, INNOVATION, THEN DIFFUSION
 In discussing the time for a change associated with a technology,
 it is necessary to consider invention and innovation as well as
 diffusion. Discourse now customarily distinguishes among these
 three concepts following the classic analyses made in the 1930s by
 the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter.3 Invention is the first
 demonstration of the principal feasibility of a proposed new arti
 fact or solution. Fermi's Chicago reactor demonstrated the feasi
 bility of a controlled nuclear fission reaction (invention). In 1958,
 sixteen years after the inauguration of Fermi's pile, the Shippingport,
 Pennsylvania, reactor went into operation to generate commercial
 electric power (innovation). Some forty years later more than one
 hundred nuclear reactors now generate some 20 percent of the
 electricity in the United States (diffusion). Analogously, we might
 say St. Robert invented the Cistercian rule, St. Bernard innovated,
 and diffusion followed.
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 In fact, considering the Cistercian rule as a technology makes an
 important point. In the narrowest definition, technology is repre
 sented by the objects people make, axes and arrowheads and their
 updated equivalents. Anthropologists call them "artifacts"; engi
 neers call them "hardware." But technology does not end here.
 Artifacts must be produced, that is, invented, designed, and manu
 factured. This process requires a larger system of hardware (ma
 chinery, a manufacturing plant), factor inputs (labor, energy, raw
 materials), and finally "software" (human knowledge and skills).
 The third of these elements, which French scholars call tech
 nique, represents the disembodied aspect of technology, its knowl
 edge base. Technique is required not only for the production of
 given artifacts but ultimately also for their use, both at the level of
 the individual and at the level of society. An individual must
 know, for example, how to drive a car; a society must know how
 to conduct an election. Organizational and institutional forms
 (including markets), social norms, and attitudes all shape how
 particular systems of production and use of artifacts emerge and
 function. They are the originating and selection mechanisms of
 particular artifacts (or combinations thereof) and set the rate at
 which they become incorporated into a given socioeconomic set
 ting. This process of filtering, tailoring, and acceptance is technol
 ogy diffusion.
 Before discussing diffusion further, let us return to the prior
 processes, invention and innovation. In truth, a realistic history of
 social and technological innovations would consist mostly of non
 starters. The overwhelming share of inventions are ignored. And
 an analysis of several hundred major innovations over the past
 two centuries shows a typical span of about fifteen to forty years
 between invention and innovation.4 Moreover, the existence of
 one or more possible innovations in itself hardly guarantees subse
 quent diffusion.
 To appreciate the uncertainty in the early phases of technology
 development, let us look at a historical problem of technological
 hazard and environmental pollution from steam railways. In the
 early days of railroad expansion in the United States, sparks in the
 smoke from wood-burning steam locomotives caused a consider
 able fire hazard to both human settlements and forests.5 Inventors
 and entrepreneurs registered more than one thousand patents on
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 "smoke-spark arresters" during the nineteenth century in a futile
 search for a solution, which arrived finally not by an add-on
 technology but by the replacement of steam by diesel and electric
 locomotives. This large number of alternatives illustrates that di
 versity and experimentation are precursors to diffusion. Many are
 called, but few are chosen.
 Moreover, what is chosen for diffusion is not necessarily the
 best. The selection of a particular technological alternative may
 not conform to ex ante or ex post judgments about optimality.
 Sometimes selection of a particular alternative stems from an
 accumulation of small, even random events, eventually "locking
 in" a particular configuration. Thereafter, positive feedback mecha
 nisms yield increasing returns to adoption of the standardized
 alternative. We suspect that the standard gauge of railroads or the
 disk operating systems in use now in personal computers are not
 the "best" but simply prevailed at a certain time in history and
 therefore can only be dislodged with great difficulty.6
 What are the factors in setting the diffusion clock? One is
 simply opposition to change. Opposition to proposed and diffus
 ing technologies always recurs. The most cited case is the Luddites,
 who destroyed knitting and other textile machinery between 1811
 and 1816. A similar movement, led by Captain Swing, resisted the
 introduction of mechanical threshing in rural England in the 1830s.
 As shown in Figure 2, the opposition to the machines was itself an
 orderly diffusive process. The time it took for the craze to smash
 machines to spread?two weeks?shows that social interaction
 and communication were highly effective far in advance of mod
 ern transport and telephony. Although opposition causes uncer
 tainty about the eventual fate of an innovation, it fulfills twj)
 important evolutionary roles. First, it can operate as a selection
 mechanism for rejecting socially unsustainable solutions ^r tech
 nologies. Second, it helps qualify technologies to respond to soci
 etal concerns, improving their performance and thus enabling fur
 ther, even pervasive, diffusion.
 In a classic 1936 article Earl Pemberton provided many illumi
 nating examples of curves of gradual cultural diffusion.7 The first
 country to introduce postage stamps was England in 1840. Such a
 good idea; yet it took close to fifty years for a sampling of thirty
 seven independent states in Europe, North America, and South
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 Figure 2. Resistance to Technology as a Diffusion Process: Number of
 Threshing Machines Attacked during the Captain Swing Movement in
 England in 1830.
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 America to imitate. A more delicate idea, touching on the nature
 and control of the family, is the first compulsory school atten
 dance law, enacted at the state level in the United States in 1847.
 It took fully eighty years, until 1927, for the last state then belong
 ing to the United States to adopt similar legislation. These ex
 amples already emphasize that changes in technologies and social
 techniques are not one-time, discrete events but rather a process
 characterized by time lags and often lengthy periods of diffusion.
 They also suggest that when diffusion succeeds, the forces and
 factors determining its speed and extent may change over time.8
 Performance, cost, fashion, and familiarity are among the consid
 erations. Nevertheless, the diversity and complex interactions at
 the micro level appear often to lead to smooth, orderly behavior at
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 the macro level, whether of Cistercians and Luddites, or, as we
 shall see, canals and passenger cars. Some theorists argue that
 orderly macroeconomic evolution requires such microeconomic
 diversity, which at first glance might instead seem likely to dissi
 pate order.9
 In addition to sociological and economic factors, straightfor
 ward, generic considerations appear to influence the speed of
 diffusion. The scope of technical change itself is a powerful one.
 We might distinguish four levels: 1) incremental improvements; 2)
 radical changes in individual technologies and artifacts; 3) changes
 in technology systems, that is, combinations of radical changes in
 technologies combined with organizational and managerial changes;
 and 4) changes in clusters and families of technologies and in
 associated organizational and institutional settings.10 The latter
 levels of change, as well as larger system sizes, will likely entail
 longer times for diffusion.11
 In sum, inventive and innovative activities provide the potentials
 for change. However, diffusion translates these potentials into
 changes in social practice. One abbey could not transform Euro
 pean agriculture; 740 did. Diffusive, largely imitative or repetitive
 phenomena are at the heart of the changes in society and its
 material structures, infrastructures, and artifacts. Thus, in the sub
 sequent discussion, the analysis of time required for diffusion
 provides the central metric to analyze processes of social and
 technological change. Let us now try to grasp the main patterns.
 THE DURATION OF DIFFUSION
 We will consider an increasingly complex series of cases of tech
 nology diffusion, characterized by the environment in which diffu
 sion processes operate. In the simplest case, an idea, practice, or
 artifact represents so radical a departure from existing solutions
 that it largely creates its own market niche. In practice, preexisting
 means for meeting basic social functions, such as transport and
 communication, are always present; nothing is truly new or free of
 competitors. Physicist Elliott Montroll called evolution a sequence
 of replacements.12 But clearly, some technologies enter much more
 accommodating environments than others.
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 The development of canals in the early nineteenth century offers
 a reasonable case of simple diffusion. In fact, the actual data on
 the growth of the canal network in the United States are approxi
 mated very well by a symmetrical growth curve, a three-parameter
 logistic equation in this case (Figure 3).13 The estimated upper
 limit of the diffusion process, some 4,000 miles of canals, matches
 the historical maximum of 4,053 miles of canal in operation in
 1851. The characteristic duration of diffusion (or Ai), defined as
 the time required for the process to unfold from 10 percent to 90
 percent of its extent, is thirty-one years. The canals spread through
 the United States at about the same rate as the Cistercians initially
 spread through Europe. The entire canal diffusion cycle from 1
 percent to 99 percent spans some sixty years. The year of maxi
 mum growth, or midpoint (tm), occurred in 1835.
 Subsequent major transport infrastructures, rails and roads,
 evolved along a dynamic pattern similar to canals, as Figure 4
 illustrates.14 In the figure the sizes of individual networks have
 Figure 3. Growth of the Canal Network in Operation in the United
 States.
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 been normalized for better comparability; in absolute extension,
 railways and surfaced road networks were one and two orders of
 magnitude larger, respectively, than canals at their maximum net
 work length. Not surprisingly, the duration of the growth of
 railway and surfaced road networks is somewhat slower, Afs of
 fifty-five and sixty-four years, respectively. Interestingly, we see
 the three major historic transport infrastructures spaced rhythmi
 cally apart in their development by a half century or so.
 Transport infrastructures strongly influence nearly every aspect
 of daily life.15 Here we will comment only on their close relation
 ship with other infrastructures. As Figure 4 suggests, the railway
 and the telegraph evolved together, as did the road network and
 the oil pipelines delivering the fuel for the cars on the roads. This
 synchronization illustrates technological interdependence and cross
 enhancement. Particular technologies and techniques do not dif
 fuse in isolation but in a larger context, as we shall discuss below.
 In fact, a new solution does not evolve in a vacuum but interacts
 with existing practices and technologies. One technology replaces
 or substitutes for another, with varying degrees of direct one-to
 one competition. For example, after reaching its maximum size,
 Figure 4. Growth of Infrastructures in the United States as a Percentage
 of their Maximum Network Size.
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 the canal network declined rapidly because of vicious competition
 from railways. Looking at relative "market shares" of competing
 alternatives rather than at absolute volumes makes the interaction
 visible.
 Probably the most famous case of technological substitution is
 motor cars for horses. In this case, the diffusion of one technologi
 cal artifact, the passenger car, began simply by replacing another,
 the riding horse and the carriage. Looking at the absolute numbers
 of draft animals and cars in the United States (Figure 5), we see
 that the millions of horses and mules used for transport practically
 disappeared from the roads within fewer than three decades. Mea
 sured by a curve fit to a model of logistic substitution,16 the
 duration of the replacement process (A?) was only twelve years,
 fast enough to traumatize the oat growers and the blacksmiths.17
 Interestingly, the diffusion of a modern anti-pollution device, the
 catalytic converter, also occurred with a Ai of twelve years in the
 Figure 5. Number of Non-Farm Draft Animals and Automobiles.
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 Figure 6. Diffusion of Cars with First Emission Controls and Catalytic
 Converters in the United States, in fractional shares of total car fleet.
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 United States (Figure 6). The reason is probably that the lifetime of
 the road vehicle has not changed since the horse-and-carriage era;
 the working lives of horses and cars both last about ten to twelve
 years.
 The continuing growth of the car population in Figure 5 illus
 trates another dynamic feature of technological evolution: growth
 beyond the initial substitution or field of application. Use of the
 car grew initially by replacing horses. After completion of that
 process in the 1930s, new markets were created. Higher average
 speeds, greater reliability in all weather conditions, and other
 features opened chances both for competition with trains for long
 distance travel and for short-distance commuting that created
 suburbs, which in turn created more demand for cars. Currently
 some 150 million passenger cars are registered in the United States,
 about 0.6 cars per capita.
 Mention of the sequence of horses, trains, and cars brings us to
 consider the most realistic process of technological change: mul
 tiple competing technologies. In steel manufacturing as many as
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 Figure 7. Process Technology Change in US Steel Manufacturing, in
 fractional shares of raw steel tonnage produced.
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 Source: Nebojsa Nakicenovic, "Technological Substitution and Long Waves in the USA,"
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 Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, No. 340 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987).
 four technologies have competed simultaneously with decreasing
 and increasing market shares (Figure 7). The diffusion trajectories
 of the processes are diverse, with Ai's ranging from less than two
 decades (replacement of the crucible process) to nearly seven de
 cades (diffusion of electric arc steel). These changes in process
 technology not only enabled significant expansion of production
 but mattered greatly from an environmental perspective. They
 coincided with changes in energy supplies toward higher quality
 and cleaner energy carriers, consistent with the overall evolution
 of energy supply.18 Between 1800 and 1930 in the United States,
 one hundred million cords of hardwood are estimated to have
 been cut for charcoal for smelting iron.19
 Let us now bring space back into our time picture. We have
 drawn examples so far from the United States. We commented at
 the outset about the patterns in space as well as the time of the
 diffusion of the Cistercian rule. Does the same hold true for a
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 modern technology such as the motor car? Like Burgundy and its
 Cistercians, the United States was the earliest adopter of the car
 and has achieved the highest density of cars. Having started to
 adopt cars rapidly about the year 1910, America now has almost
 six hundred cars per thousand people. Having started in 1930, the
 United Kingdom now parks about four hundred cars per thousand
 people, while Japan parks about three hundred per thousand,
 having started the adoption process only in the 1950s. As Figure 8
 suggests, empirical data from numerous countries show that later
 adopters manifest both an accelerated diffusion rate (shorter diffu
 sion time) and a declining density of adoption as a function of the
 introductory date. The case of cars is corroborated by analysis of
 the declining adoption densities of "late-starters" in the railway
 development of the nineteenth century.20
 The spread of railway networks in fact clearly shows how both
 spatial densities and the temporal rates of the adoption of tech
 nologies remain diverse. In the United States, the early innovation
 centers for railways on the East Coast and around the Great Lakes
 achieved by far the greatest spatial density of networks. Railway
 construction reached the West Coast some fifty years after the East
 Coast, and network densities remained significantly lower. In Eu
 rope, rails spread from the north of England in the 1820s to the
 rest of England and also to Belgium. By 1836 independent innova
 tion centers had arisen in the Lyons region of France and Austria
 Bohemia. The railway innovation wave spread from the early
 continental centers to cover most of Western and Central Europe
 by the 1850s. By the mid 1870s all of Eastern Europe, as well as
 most of European Russia, southern Scandinavia, and part of the
 Balkans, were networked. The final European subinnovation cen
 ter was Greece, toward 1900. Rails penetrated the Albanian re
 gion almost a century after England. Starting first, England built a
 network (with attendant costs and benefits) one-third denser than
 Germany, almost twice the density of France, and ten or more
 times denser than other countries that might have appeared com
 parable at the outset of the railroad era.
 In this light, we can ask, is the United States a likely guide for
 future mass-motorization globally? According to our understand
 ing, no. Instead, the high density of cars in the United States results
 from specific initial conditions, including high individual mobility
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 before the advent of the automobile and a long period of diffusion,
 which created precisely the conditions in life-style, spatial division
 of labor, and settlement patterns of an "automobile society." As
 Figure 8 indicates, heterogeneity in rates of diffusion and thus
 levels of adoption follows orders and thus is likely to persist, not
 only for railways and autos but in general for systems that diffuse
 globally. This perspective leads to lower-than-usual estimates of
 future demand for transport energy for China, for example.21
 Figure 8. Passenger Car Diffusion at the Global Level: Catch-Up, but
 at Lower Adoption Levels.
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 SEASONS OF SATURATION
 We have noted that clusters of radical innovations and technology
 systems, interdependent and mutually cross-enhancing, give rise to
 families of technological innovations with associated new institu
 tional and organizational settings. For example, the development
 of the automotive industry was contingent on developments in
 materials (high-quality steel sheets), the chemical industries (oil
 refining, in particular catalytic cracking), production and supply
 infrastructures (exploration and oil production, pipelines and gasoline
 stations), development of public infrastructures (roads), and a host
 of other technological innovations. The growth of the industry
 was based on a new production organization (Fordist mass pro
 duction combined with Taylor ist scientific management principles),
 yielding significant real-term cost reductions that made the car
 affordable to more social strata, thus changing settlement pat
 terns, consumption habits of the population, and leisure activities.
 In turn, the automobile is just one artifact among many consumer
 durables now standard in every household in industrialized coun
 tries. These linkages multiply the effects of such techno-institu
 tional clusters on the economy and society and account for their
 pervasive impact.
 To quantify the emergence of technology clusters, I analyzed the
 history of a large sample of technologies for the United States.22
 Consistent with the definition of technology adopted here, the
 sample used in the analysis was not taken from the hard technol
 ogy field alone. The cases included diffusion of energy, transport,
 manufacturing, agriculture, consumer durables, communication,
 and military technologies, as well as diffusion of economic and
 social processes, such as literacy, reduction of infant mortality,
 and changes in job classes. Two samples were analyzed. The first
 consisted of 117 diffusion cases that my colleagues at the Interna
 tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and I had studied
 ourselves.23 The second sample was augmented by additional, well
 documented cases with a quantification of diffusion parameters
 that we found in the literature. This sample totaled 265 cases of
 innovation.
 The profile of the diffusion rates, or A ?'s, was quite similar for
 the two samples. The rates ranged from very short-term processes
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 of only a few years to processes that extended over two to three
 centuries. The mean value ranged between forty and sixty years,
 with a standard deviation of about equal size (Figure 9). The
 largest number of diffusion processes in our samples have charac
 teristic durations, Af s, of between fifteen and thirty years.24 If our
 diffusion studies had documented more of the seemingly numerous
 short-term phenomena such as clothing fashions, the profile of the
 histogram in Figure 9 would likely approach a "rank-size" or Zipf
 distribution in which the frequency of diffusion rates would be
 highest for fast processes and decline as the rates became slower.25
 The good news for the human environment from our analysis is
 that the majority of artifacts and practices can be replaced within
 a few decades. However, some key processes have demonstrably
 long durations. For example, the global quests for improvements
 Figure 9. Histogram of Diffusion Rates of Samples of 117 and 265
 Processes of Technological, Economic, and Social Change in the United
 States.
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 in the thermodynamic efficiency of prime movers and for the
 decarbonization of the energy system both clock in at about three
 hundred years.26 In general, pervasive transformations take time.
 The transformation of the US population from a society of farmers
 to manufacturers to service workers took some two hundred years.27
 Societies starting the move from brown to blue and to white
 collars later may accordingly move faster, but such all-embracing
 processes will never collapse to weeks and months.
 We might summarize by saying that at any time, change in a
 society can be decomposed into a large number of diffusion (or
 substitution) processes with great variety in their rates. We can
 then ask whether aggregate measures exist for the average diffu
 sion rate over time for the whole socioeconomic system and whether
 it changes. For such a measure, I calculated the average diffusion
 rates of the innovation samples, that is, the sum of the first deriva
 tives of the diffusion (or substitution) trajectories at each point in
 time divided by the number of diffusion processes then occurring.
 This indicator is the diffusion equivalent of the annual GNP growth
 rate. The resulting measure rates the average annual technical (and
 economic and social) change at the country level.28
 For the United States since 1800, the calculated average diffu
 sion rate portrays clear peaks and troughs, which vary by a factor
 of two or more. The process of change is not gradual and linear
 but is instead characterized by long swings and discontinuities. In
 addition, rates of change tend to increase over time. This rise may
 reflect that the closer we approach the present, the more processes
 are included in the sample. However, the rising average rate of
 change could also result from the cumulative nature of technologi
 cal change. Even though no individual diffusion process may pro
 ceed faster when compared to the past, the number and variety of
 artifacts (particularly those with faster turnover rates) are in fact
 much larger today than earlier. This could increase the average
 rate of change. In other words, while no individual technology or
 artifact diffuses faster than it did in the past (other things being
 equal), many more technologies and objects are in use, and thus
 more change. In any case, the analyses show pronounced
 discontinuities and also a decline in the diffusion rate in the de
 cades after 1970, indicating an increase in saturation phenomena
 in the United States since then.
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 The fluctuations and discontinuities in the long-term rate of
 sociotechnical change result from the complex dynamics of the
 discontinuous rates at which individual innovations appear and
 from the different rates of absorption of these innovations in the
 socioeconomic system. Periods of accelerating rates appear to indi
 cate the emergence of a technology cluster in which a large number
 of interrelated innovations diffuse into the economic and social
 environment. These in turn contribute, by means of backward and
 forward linkages, to prolonged periods of economic growth.
 Periods in which progressively more and more innovations enter
 their saturation phase of diffusion follow the growth periods.
 Thus, each major peak in the average rate of change characterizes
 the start of saturation of a corresponding cluster or family of
 diffusion processes. This "season of saturations" results in a sig
 nificant decline in the average rate of technical and social change
 and, through market saturation and a decrease in investments,
 also contributes to a slowdown in economic growth.
 Presumably many inventions of the past few decades now await
 their chance to become successful innovations. Were they included,
 these could reverse the recent downward trend in the rate-of
 change curve by the late 1990s. Then the successful innovations,
 after a slow initial diffusion, would enter into the rapid, indeed
 exponentially growing part of their life cycle.
 The turning points in the rates of diffusion of technological and
 social innovations coincide with the turning points of so-called
 long-waves of economic growth as identified by several research
 ers.29 In the analysis of US data, the peaks?the maxima in the rate
 of sociotechnical change and the onset of leveling off and satura
 tion phenomena?occurred in 1840, 1912, and 1970, respectively.
 Troughs, maxima of saturation periods and the slow beginning of
 a new phase of accelerated sociotechnical change, occurred in
 1820,1875, and 1930. Appropriately, these troughs correspond to
 periods of pronounced recession, even depression, in the economic
 development of the United States.'
 From a historical perspective we can associate four technology
 clusters with this statistical pattern and speculate on the emer
 gence of a fifth. The clusters may be identified by their most
 important economic branches, infrastructures, or functioning prin
 ciples. Extending to the 1820s, we find textiles, turnpikes, and
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 water mills; extending until about 1870 we find steam, canals, and
 iron; extending until about 1940 we find coal, railways, steel, and
 industrial electrification; extending to the present we find oil,
 roads, plastics, and consumer electrification.30 Currently we ap
 pear to be in transition to a new era of industrial and economic
 development. We can speculate that it will be characterized by
 natural gas, aviation, "total quality control" of both the internal
 and external (or environmental) quality of industrial production,
 and the massive expansion of information handling.
 These observations add up to an essentially Schumpeterian view
 of long-term development. Major economic expansion periods
 appear driven by the widespread diffusion of a host of interrelated
 innovations?a technology cluster?leading to new products, mar
 kets, industries, and infrastructures. These diffusion processes are
 sustained by, in fact are contingent on, mediating social and orga
 nizational diffusion processes. The growth or diffusion of a domi
 nant cluster cannot be sustained indefinitely, however.
 Market saturation, the dwindling improvement of possibilities
 for existing process technologies, managerial and organizational
 settings, and an increasing awareness of the negative (specifically,
 environmental) externalities involved in the further extension of
 the dominant growth regime pave the way to a season of satura
 tions. During such periods, opportunities arise for the introduction
 of new technological, organizational, and social solutions, some of
 which may have been latent but were barred from market entry by
 the dominance of the previous growth paradigm. Even when such
 innovations are introduced successfully, their penetration rates in
 the initial phase of their diffusion life cycle are rather slow, and a
 matching new social and economic mediating context has still to
 emerge. In the phase-transition period, the old is saturating, and
 the new is still embryonic. Only after such a period of transition,
 crisis, and mismatch does a prolonged period of widespread diffu
 sion of a new sociotechnical "bandwagon" and thus of growth
 become possible.
 CONCLUSIONS
 Empirical examination of diffusion processes, as illustrated in this
 essay, highlight the following observations:
 3 8 Arnulf Gr?bler
 1) No innovation spreads instantaneously. Instead, a typical S
 shaped temporal pattern seems to be the rule. This basic pattern
 appears invariant, although the regularity and timing of diffusion
 processes vary greatly.
 2) Diffusion is a spatial as well as temporal phenomenon. Origi
 nating from innovation centers, a particular idea, practice, or
 artifact spreads out to its hinterland by means of a hierarchy of
 subinnovation centers and into the periphery, defined spatially,
 functionally, or socially.
 3) The periphery, while starting adoption later, profits from
 learning and the experience gained in the core area and generally
 has faster adoption rates. As the development time is shorter,
 however, the absolute adoption intensity is lower than in innova
 tion centers or in core areas (spatial or functional) proximate to
 them.
 4) Although diffusion is essentially a process of imitation and
 homogenization, it clusters and lumps. The densities of application
 remain discontinuous in time and heterogeneous in space among
 the population of potential adopters and across different social
 strata. In fact, overall development trajectories appear necessarily
 punctuated by crises that emerge in transitional periods. As such,
 diffusion and its discontinuities may be among the inherent fea
 tures of the evolutionary process that governs social behavior.
 Nevertheless, appropriate incentives and policies may nurture
 the development of more benign technologies and their diffusion,
 and many changes can be implemented over a time frame of two
 to three decades. However, sectors and areas will also remain in
 which changes will occur much more slowly, particularly those
 related to the long-lived structures of our built environment: for
 example, infrastructures for transport and energy as well as hous
 ing stock. Here rates of change and diffusion constants ranging
 from several decades to a century are typical and will be costly to
 accelerate. Therefore, the efficiency with which existing systems
 are used merits attention.
 In essence we have two strategies in light of diffusion. One
 focuses on incremental changes, for example, environmental add
 on or "end-of-pipe" technologies. Such policies can bring quick
 changes but tend to reinforce the dominant trajectory, blocking
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 more systemic and radical changes. A second strategy opts for
 more radical departures from existing technologies and practices.
 However, these strategies, such as the development of fuel cells
 and hydrogen for energy, although more effective in the long run,
 require much more time to implement because of the multiplicity
 of forward and backward linkages between technologies, infra
 structures, and forms of organization for their production and use.
 The interdependence between individual artifacts and long-lived
 infrastructures creates our dilemma. Within two to three decades
 the United States could in principle change its entire fleet to zero
 emission vehicles. In fact, 99 percent of vehicles now on the road
 will be scrapped in this interval. Yet, this interval is too short for
 the diffusion of the required associated energy supply, transport,
 and delivery infrastructures, which will inevitably distend the rate
 of diffusion of end-use devices. Thus, key technologies that we can
 already envision to raise the quality of the environment probably
 must await the second half of the twenty-first century to become
 widespread and influential.
 Historically, technology clusters have been instrumental in rais
 ing productivity and also in alleviating many adverse environmen
 tal effects. The emergence of a new cluster could hold the promise
 of an environmentally more compatible technological trajectory.
 But it will take time. There are times of change and times for
 change, and unless our individual and collective behavior is modi
 fied, these times will remain to frustrate and excite us.
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